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The Creative Common Misunderstanding
Florian Cramer
Oct. 8, 2006
Lately, the growing popularity of the Creative Commons licenses
has been accompanied by a growing amount of criticism. The objections
are substantial and boil down to the following points: that the
Creative Commons licenses are fragmented, do not define a common
minimum standard of freedoms and rights granted to users or even fail
to meet the criteria of free licenses altogether, and that unlike the
Free Software and Open Source movements, they follow a philosophy of
reserving rights of copyright owners rather than granting them to
audiences. Yet it would be too simple to only blame the Creative
Commons organization for those issues. Having failed to set their own
agenda and competently voice what they want, artists, critics and
activists have their own share in the mess.
In his paper "Towards a Standard of Freedom: Creative
Commons and the Free Software Movement," free software activist
Benjamin Mako Hill analyzes that "despite CC's stated desire
to learn from and build upon the example of the free software
movement, CC sets no defined limits and promises no freedoms, no
rights, and no fixed qualities. Free software's success is built
upon an ethical position. CC sets no such standard."1 In
other words, the Creative Commons licenses lack an underlying ethical
code, political constitution or philosophical manifesto such as the
Free Software Foundation's Free Software Definition or
Debian's Social Contract and the Open Source
Initiative's Open Source Definition.2
Derived from each other, these three documents all define free and
open source software as computer programs that may be freely copied,
used for any purpose, studied and modified on source code level and
distributed in modified form. The concrete free software licenses,
such as the GNU General Public License (GPL), the BSD license and the
Perl Artistic License, are not ends in themselves, but only express
individual implementations of those constitutions in legal terms;
they translate politics into policies.
Such politics are absent from the Creative Commons. As Mako
Hill points out, the "non-commercial" CC licenses prohibit
use for any purpose, the "no-derivatives" licenses prohibit
modification, and the CC "Sampling License" and
"Developing Nations License" even disallow verbatim
copying. As a result, none of the user rights granted by free and
open source software are ensured by the mere fact that a work has
been released under a Creative Commons license. To say that something
is available under a CC license is meaningless in practice. Not only
does the CC symbol look like a fashion logo, it also isn't more
than one. Richard Stallman, founder of the GNU project and author of
the Free Software Definition, finds that "all these licenses
have in common is a label, but people regularly mistake that common
label for something substantial."3 Yet some if only vague
programmatic substance is expressed in CC's motto "Some
rights reserved." Beyond being, quote Mako Hill, a
"relatively hollow call," this slogan factually reverses
the Free Software and Open Source philosophy of reserving rights to
users, not copyright owners, in order to allow the former to
become producers themselves.
While Mako Hill embraces at least a few of the CC licenses,
such as the ShareAlike License under which his own essay is
available, Stallman finds it a "self-delusion to try to endorse
just some of the Creative Commons licenses, because people lump them
together; they will misconstrue any endorsement of some as a blanket
endorsement of all."4 According to an entry on his weblog,
Stallman had "asked the leaders of Creative Commons privately to
change their policies, but they declined, so we had to part
ways."5 The Debian project even considers all
CC licenses non-free and recommended, in 2004, that "authors who
wish to create works compatible with the Debian Free Software
Guidelines should not use any of the licenses in the Creative Commons
license suite,"6 mostly because their attribution clause
limits modifications, because of restrictions on the Creative Commons
trademark and ambiguously worded anti-"Digital Rights
Management" (DRM) provisions that could be interpreted as
prohibiting distribution over any encrypted channel, including for
example PGP-encoded E-Mail and anonymizing proxy servers.
Whatever stance one may adopt, the name "Creative
Commons" is misleading because it doesn't create a commons
at all. A picture released, for example, under the
Attribution-ShareAlike license cannot legally be integrated into a
video released under the Attribution-NonCommercial license, audio
published under the Sampling License can't be used on its
soundtrack. Such incompatible license terms put what is supposed to
be "free content" or "free information" back to
square one, that is, the default restrictions of copyright - hardly
that what Lawrence Lessig, founder of the Creative Commons, could
have meant with "free culture" and "read-write
culture" as opposed to "read-only culture." In his
blog entry "Creative Commons Is Broken," Alex Bosworth,
program manager at the open source company SourceLabs, points out
that "of eight million photos" posted under a CC license on
Flickr.com "less than a fifth allow free remixing of content
under terms similar to an open source license. More than a third
don't allow any modifications at all."7 The
"principle problem with Creative Commons," he writes,
"is that most of the creative commons content is not actually
reuseable at all."
While these problems may at least hypothetically be solved
through improvements of the CC license texts - with the license
compatibility clauses in the draft of the GNU GPL version 3 as a
possible model -, there are farther-reaching issues on the level of
politics as opposed to merely policies. CC's self-definition that
"our licenses help you keep your copyright while inviting
certain uses of your work - a `some rights reserved'
copyright" translate into what the software developer and Neoist
Dmytri Kleiner phrases as follows: "the Creative Commons, is to
help `you' (the `Producer') to keep control of `your'
work." Kleiner concludes that "the right of the
`consumer' is not mentioned, neither is the division of
`producer' and `consumer' disputed. The Creative
`Commons' is thus really an Anti-Commons, serving to legitimise,
rather than deny, Producer-control and serving to enforce, rather
than do away with, the distinction between producer and
consumer."8 Citing Lessig's examples of DJ
Dangermouse's "Grey Album" and Javier Prato's
"Jesus Christ: The Musical" - "projects torpedoed by
the legal owners of the music used in the production of the
works" - Kleiner sharply observes that "the legal
representatives of the Beatles and Gloria Gaynor could just as easily
have used Creative Commons licences to enforce their control over the
use of their work."
The distinction between "consumers" and
"producers" couldn't be more bluntly stated than on
CC's home page. It displays, on its very top, two large clickable
buttons, one labelled "FIND Music, photos and more," the
other "PUBLISH Your Stuff, safely and legally," the former
with a down arrow, the latter with an up arrow in its logo.9 The
small letters are no less remarkable than the capitals. Upon first
glance, the adverbs "safely and legally" sound odd and like
material for a future cultural history museum of post-Napster and
post-9/11 paranoia. But above all, they name and perpetuate the
fundamental misunderstanding artists seem to have of the Creative
Commons: Free licenses were not meant to be, and aren't, a
liability insurance against getting sued for use of third-party
copyrighted or trademarked material. Whoever expects to gain this
from putting work under a Creative Commons license, is completely
mistaken.
Artists are desperately looking for a solution to a problem
that ultimately resulted from their own efforts of redefining art.
When art was granted, in Western cultures at least, an autonomous
status, artists were - to a moderate degree - exempt from a number of
legal norms. Kurt Schwitters was not sued for collaging the logo of
German Commerzbank into his "Merz" painting which yielded
his "Merz" art. Neither did Andy Warhol receive injunctions
for using Coca Cola's and Campbell's trademarks. As long as
these symbols remained inside the art world, they did not raise
corporate eyebrows. Experimental artists embraced the Internet just
because it did away with the separation of white cubes - in which
logos and trademarks were safe from being mixed up with the original
ones - and the outside world. Mainly thanks to the Internet, artistic
simulations of corporate entities were believable for the first time.
The Yes Men could pose as the World Trade Organisation and get
invited to World Economic Forum as WTO representatives,
0100101110101101.org could tactically disguise themselves as the Nike
company. Older artistic simulations like Res Ingold's
"Ingold Airlines" were not only transparent and clumsy in
comparison, but also on the safe grounds of an art system with little
or no interference of corporate lawyers. But ever since the World
Wide Web, file sharing and cheap or free authoring software tore down
walls between art and non-art practice, producers and consumers,
former consumers were held liable as producers, and artistic
production became subject to non-art world norms, as obvious in the
FBI investigations of Steve Kurtz and ubermorgen.com for
bioterrorism, respectively tampering the U.S. presidential elections.
Previous artistic critiques of corporate and intellectual
ownership were much less efficacious even where they were
programmatically more radical. Between 1988 and 1989, a series of
countercultural "Festivals of Plagiarism," organized by
Stewart Home, Graham Harwood and others, struggled with wide gaps
between radical anti-copyright rhetoric and an artistic practice
limited mostly to photocopied mail art work. John Berndt, a
participant of the London Festival of Plagiarism, left with the
impression that "a repetitive critique of 'ownership` and
'originality` in culture was juxtaposed with collective events,
in which a majority of participants [...] simply wanted to have their
'aesthetic` and vaguely political artwork exposed,"10
making fellow Neoist tENTATIVELY, a cONVENIENCE conclude that
"Festivals of Recycling might have been more accurate
descriptions" for the events: "By virtue of calling the act
of reusing and changing previously existing material (not even always
with the intention of critiqueing said material) 'Plagiarism` the
appearance of being 'radical` could be given to people whose work
was otherwise straight out of art school teachings."11
Today, similar gaps and misunderstandings exist between
copyleft activists and artists who just seek to legitimize their use
of third-party material. When Lawrence Lessig characterizes the
Creative Commons as "'fair use`-plus: a promise that any
freedoms given are always in addition to the freedoms guaranteed by
the law,"12 this is technically correct, but
nevertheless misunderstandable, especially for people who aren't
legal experts. Putting a work under a CC license - or even a
non-ambiguously free GNU or BSD license - means to grant
rather than to gain uses in addition to standard fair use.
The Creative Commons do not solve the problem of how not to get sued
by Coca Cola or Campbell's at all. Non-free copyrighted material
cannot be freely incorporated into one's work no matter what
license one choses. Even worse, the opposite is true: copyright
owners are most likely to categorically refuse clearance for anything
that will be put into free circulation because the license of the
work incorporating their's would effectively relicense the
latter. If, for example, the Corbis corporation would permit the
photograph of Einstein sticking out his tongue - for which it holds
the rights - to be reproduced in a freely licensed book, it would
free the picture for anyone else's use as well. Since this can
hardly be expected from the Bill Gates-owned company, free licensing
often restrains rather than expands one's possibilities of using
third-party material.
This example reveals a crucial difference between software
development and artistic practice: Programming can sustain itself on
its own, self-built library of reusable work, art hardly so. The GNU
copyleft works on the premise that modifications are also
contributions. If, for example, a company like IBM choses to modify
the Linux kernel to run on its own servers, the GNU license forces it
to give back the added code to the development community. And the
more code is available as free software, the higher the incentive for
others to simply build on existing free code libraries and give back
changes rather than building a new program from scratch. This
explains why even for computer companies, free software development
can make more economic sense than the close source commercial model.
In addition, free software development profits from a difference
between source code and perceivable appearance that doesn't have
an exact equivalent in most artistic work: Programs can be written
that look and behave similar or identical to proprietary counterparts
as long as they don't use proprietary code and do not infringe on
patents and trademarks. This way, AT&T's Unix could be
rewritten as BSD and GNU/Linux, and Microsoft Office could be cloned
as OpenOffice. Even patents which could spoil such borrowings
aren't as internationally universal and not remotely as
long-lasting as copyright. In other words, free software development
could be an "appropriation art" without copyright
infringement.
The same isn't possible for most artists, however. It makes
little sense for them to restrict their uses to material whose
copyright has either expired or that has been released under
sufficiently free terms. The Coca Cola logo can't be cloned as a
copylefted "FreeCola" logo, and it would be pointless for
the Yes Men to pose as an "OpenWTO" or for
0100101110101101.org to have run as "GNUke" instead of
Nike. If even harmless collaging, sampling and quoting becomes risky
because of media industrial Internet copyright paranoia and whole
business models based on injunctions and lawsuits, this is a
political matter of fair use, not of free licenses. In the worst
case, free licenses, all the more fluffy and pseudo-free ones like
the Creative Commons, could be used to legitimize new restrictions of
fair use legislation, or even its abolition altogether, with the
alibi that the so-called "ecosystem," or ghetto, of more or
less freely licensed work provides enough fair use for those who
bother to care.13
It is not hard to bash the Creative Commons for being an
organization run with little understanding of the arts, and not even
a good understanding of open source and free software philosophy. On
the other hand, artists themselves have failed to voice themselves
what they want. The exceptions are few and rather marginal: the
anti-copyright philosophies and politics of Lautréamont, Woody
Guthrie (who, according to Dmytri Kleiner, released his songbook with
the license that "anybody caught singin' it without our
permission, will be mighty good friends of ours, cause we don't
give a dern. Publish it. Write it. Sing it. Swing to it. Yodel
it"), Lettrists, Situationists, Neoists, Plunderphonics
musicians and some Internet artists including the French artlibre.org
collective whose "Free Art License" predates the Creative
Commons by two years.14
A team of lawyers whose work consists of creating, as Bosworth
puts it, "low cost legal templates," the Creative Commons
organization has simply listened to all kinds of artists and
activists, trying to do justice to diverse and sometimes
contradictory needs and expectations, with licenses "designed to
give artists choice" (Mako Hill) rather than prioritizing free
use and reuse of information. In contrast, Free Software and Open
Source are, like any human and civil rights effort, universalist at
their core, with principles that are neither negotiable, nor may be
culturally relativized.
If someone is to blame for the fact that artists, political
activists and academics from the humanities have largely failed to
recognize those essentials, then it is Eric S. Raymond, founder of
the "Open Source Initative" (http://www.opensource.org),
the group that coined the term "Open Source" in 1998. The
main advantage of the term "Open Source" over "Free
Software" is that it doesn't merely refer to computer
programs, but evokes broader cultural connotations.15 For
most people with artistic backgrounds, GNU's "Free
Software" sounded too confusingly similar to (close-source)
"freeware" and "shareware." "Open
Source" sparked an all the richer imagination as Raymond
didn't simply pitch it as an alternative to proprietary
"intellectual property" regimes, but as a
"Bazaar" model of open, networked collaboration. Yet this
is not at all what the Open Source Initiative's own "Open
Source Definition" says or is about. Derived from Debian's
"Free Software Guidelines," it simply lists criteria
licenses have to meet in order to be considered free, respectively
open source. The fact that a work is available under such a license
might enable collaborative work on it, but it doesn't have to by
definition. Much free software - the GNU utilities and the free BSDs
for example - is developed by rather closed groups and committees of
programmers in what Raymond calls a "Cathedral"
methodology. Conversely, proprietary software companies such as
Microsoft may develop their code in distributed "Bazaar"
style. Nevertheless, the homepage of http://www.opensource.org
states that the "basic idea behind open source" is about
how "software evolves," "at a speed that, if one is
used to the slow pace of conventional software development, seems
astonishing," thus producing "better software than the
traditional closed model." Regardless which position one takes
in the philosophical and ideological dispute between "Free
Software" and "Open Source," the self-characterization
of Open Source as a development model mixes up cause and effect,
being inconsistent with what the Open Source Definition, on the same
website, qualifies as Open Source, i.e. software whose licenses
fulfill its criteria of openness.
Given how "Open Source" has been propagated as a
model of networked collaboration instead of user rights or free
infrastructures, the gap between the lip-service paid to it in the
arts and humanities and the factual use of free software and
copylefts comes to little surprise. "Cultural" free
software conferences whose organizers and speakers run Windows or the
Mac OS on their laptops continue to be the norm. With few exceptions,
art education hardly ever involves free software, but is tied to
proprietary software tool chains. Yet - often vague or ill-informed -
"Open Source" references abound in media studies and
electronic arts writing.
The problem is not so much that people do not use free
operating systems, but that software-political correctness anxiety
prevents a more honest critical discourse. A debate on "why free
software doesn't work for us" would be more productive for
free software development than the current hypocrisy. Recent
discussions on why, for example, free software culture involves
disproportionally few women - even in comparison to proprietary
software development - have at least begun to tackle some of those
issues.
Productive critique, after all, is needed. Eight years after
the coinage of "Open Source," Raymond's Hegelian claims
of superior development methodologies sound increasingly hollow. Free
software hasn't displaced proprietary software at all. Despite
its success on servers and in embedded systems, it is unlikely to
take over mainstream personal computing any time soon. Free software,
it seems, has its strength in building software infrastructure:
kernels, file systems, network stacks, compilers, scripting
languages, libraries, web, file and mail servers, database engines.
It lags behind proprietary offerings, for example, in conventional
desktop publishing and video editing, and, as a rule of thumb, in
anything that isn't highly modularized or used a lot by its own
developer community. The closer the software is to the daily needs
and work methods of programmers and system administrators, the higher
typically its quality.
Similar rules seem to apply to free information, respectively
"Open Content" development. The model works best for
infrastructural, general, non-individualistic information resources,
with Wikipedia and FreeDB (and lately MusicBrainz) as prime examples.
Similarly, the cultural logic of sounds and images circulating under
CC licenses is largely that of stock music, stock photography and
clip art, regardless the fact that current CC licenses mostly fail to
permit their "mashups," boiling down to little more than
"Web 2.0" lifestyle logos. Beyond software, infrastructural
information and publishing that waives reproduction rights, the value
of free licensing is somewhat doubtful. Experimental, radical art and
activism that does not play nice with third-party copyrights and
trademarks can't be legally released and used under whatever
license anyway. Its work should rather - and explicitly - be released
into the public domain with, quote jodi, "all wrongs
reversed" and, quote Kleiner, "all rights detourned under
the terms of the Woody Guthrie General License Agreement." For
professional artists, this simply means to acknowledge the reality of
contemporary art economics: that artists, with the exception of a
handful of stars, no longer live from producing material goods (for
which copyright granted lifetime monopolies, or at least the illusion
of continuous revenue streams), but like 17th century project
entrepreneurs from commissioned projects whose material products have
little or no market value by themselves.
Copyright, having turned from regulation into subsidy of
publishing industries, is the 21st century equivalent of drug
legislation. Everyone knows that it is obsolete, dysfunctional, and
depriving people of their rights; absurd wars are foughts in its
name. The simple fix is to abolish it.
Fußnoten
1Benjamin Mako Hill, Towards a
Standard of Freedom: Creative Commons and the Free Software
Movement, http://www.advogato.org/article/851.html
2http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html,
http://www.debian.org/social_contract,
http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php
3http://www.linuxp2p.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=10771
4http://www.linuxp2p.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=10771
5http://www.fsf.org/blogs/rms/entry-20050920.html
6http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2004/07/msg01193.html
7http://www.sourcelabs.com/blogs/ajb/2006/02/creative_commons_is_broken.html
8Dmytri Kleiner, The Creative
Anti-Commons and the Poverty of Networks, http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=06/09/16/2053224
9http://creativecommons.org/images/find.gif,
http://creativecommons.org/license
10John Berndt, Proletarian Posturing
and the Strike that Never Ends, SMILE magazine, Baltimore, 1988
11tENTATIVELY, a cONVENIENCE,
History Begins where Life Ends, self-published pamphlet,
Baltimore 1993
12http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5681
13This scenario isn't too
far-fetched considering Lessig's recent advocacy of the non-open
file format Adobe/Macromedia's Flash which he calls a
"crucial tool of basic digital education in a free culture"
(quotation translated from the German article http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/78278/,
see also http://lwn.net/Articles/199877/)
Since proprietary file formats cannot be universally accessed and
lock information into technology whose availability is at the mercy
of a single vendor, they restrain fair use.
14http://artlibre.org/licence/lal/en/
15 It is not coincidental, for example,
that the term "Open Content" and the web site http://www.opencontent.org
was launched in 1998 only few months after the first propagation of
"Open Source," until its founder David Wiley sacked the
initiative in 2004 in order to - ironically or not - become a
director of Creative Commons.