in this respect can be taken as an information on each of the countries civil rights and signit polices. We can also assume
that Israel possesses strong signit mideast oriented capabilities. To understand what this kind of ‘system does, | will quote
a simple definition of ECHELON:

ECHELON consists of a global network of computers that automatically search through millions of intercepted messages
and data packets for pre-programmed keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses. Every word of every message in the fre-
quencies and channels selected at a station is automatically searched. The processors in the network are known as the
ECHELON dictionaries. ECHELON connects all these computers and allows the individual stations to function as distributed
elements in an integrated system. An ECHELON station's dictionary contains not only its parent agency's chosen keywords,
but also lists for each of the other four agencies in the UKUSA system (NSA, GCHQ, DSD, GCSB and CSE). Allegedly ECHE-
LON is concentrated on the comsat traffic, although one could suppose that signit work is done also on terrestrial HF and
microwave networks.

So, with the dawn of knowledge about this signit systems, the civil community of the world should think twice before it
uses the communications infrastructure for tactical, socio-evolutionary work. The systems are of course in place to pro-
tect the national security of each of the signatories to the UKUSA agreement, and other respective countries operating
their own signit processors. The problem being, that national security is a highly broad and specifically expandable defi-
nition, that can in specific circumstances lead to prosecution of completely innocent individuals with a slightly different
political view than that of the current governments.

In this respect it is maybe time to redefine national security as the right to security of the nation and all its citizens and
other individuals, before the nation, its social and especially economical and Corporate structures and within it, and in
front of all other nations and their respective national security definitions. Such a definition and its enforcement would of
course complicate the work of any signit agency or its corporate partners, trying to indiscriminately process communica-
tions of its own citizens and individuals, and the individuals and citizens of other nations.

Privacy laws, law-enforcement information sharing and encryption laws and regulations are also being used, all for the
protection of respective national securities in a very broad sense. One thing must be clear: the board of this game has
been set long ago, and the rules redefined thereafter in continuity. That's why the civil tactical sector of society has to en-
gage in the development and implementation of its own systems to actively and consciously take part in this global system
of information sharing and especially protection. And since the internet is the main communication vehicle for the sector,
together with phone and fax, one must be aware that internet is of course also very vulnerable to any kind of privacy and
information abuse, as are the phone and fax networks. Internet is also not so redundant as it was enthusiastically thought
when the community started using it, but can be virtually shut down, channelled and single user disconnected. The other
problem with the internet is of course the restriction of privacy through encryption contro! and key recovery policies and
export and import controls. 40-56 bit DES keys which are exportable can be nowadays cracked very effectively, and there
are strong export limitations for RSA, RCS and triple DES or DES RSA key combinations and similar protocols, which en-
sure higher protection. Of course there are ways for companies to actually export some of this encryption protocols, either
through the release and sale of source code printouts, or export through friendly nations. One remembers the PGP source
code release through a printout for the HIP 97 meeting. So, some of the doors remain open and corporations, private indi-
viduals and states are still engaged in a battle of words and legislation concerning internet encryption policies, and the
very interesting case in this respect is, that the legislation concerning encryption differs from country to country and that
in many of those it is completely non transparent and each individual case subject to approval by the security agencies or
even the military and p.e. in the case of France of a lot of political lobbying and shouldering. One exception that many re-
strictive states implement is for the use of higher encryption for the banks and financial services, again, with the excep-
tion of France. So, the battle for encryption rights in the internet is Ongoing, but internet should not be the final communi-
cations frontier of the tactical civil sector. The reasons are mainly its reliance on global telecom infrastructure and its vul-
nerability that arises from it. The other reasons are the no point to point availability and the extensive use of satellite tech-
nology by global telecoms. This are all points of weakness, in respect to signit work, and privacy protection, that's why an
alternative insulator strategy must be used.

HHHWHHH HHH HHH