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by Japan. And, of course, this idea too had a history as well; the alternative world that it assumes, in which Asian areas
were not led or enlightened by Japan, speaks of a less stable or homogeneous image of these areas, divided by economy,
culture, ideology, and so on. Thus wee see that it ideas about “Asia” and so on are not at all uniquely "American,"
“European,” or “Orientalist" in their origin or effect.

More specifically, during the Edo period, Japan adhered to a policy of “isolation” and took account of the West in two pri-
mary ways: as an object of intellectual curiosity, and as a military threat. On the one hand, Japan have fried to detach it-
self from its immediately neighboring area and, on the other, it responded to Western world domination in political and
diplomatic ways. In doing so, it destroyed the Chinese imperial order and brought a new order to East Asia. It was in this
period that the previously mentioned “Asian” notion of "Asia" was developed as a way to counter the West's hegemony and
to diminish any China-centric ideas of what a more native hegemony must be. In this sense and in others, Japan has served
as a sort of “interface” between the Western civilizations and Asian ones.

This kind of classificatory complexity and depth is very much present in discourses about “Orientalism* in general.
Historically speaking, for the West "the Orient" has most often meant the “middle east"; consequently, Orientalist dis-
courses have tended to address ideologies involving those regions and areas. But as “Techno-Orientalism" has become a
crucial factor for Western cultures--indeed, for all cultures--Orientalist discourses have shifted to include or even focus on
Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, and so on. Naoki Sakai highlights this point nicely:

The Orient is neither a cultural, religious or linguistic unity.
The principle of its identity lies outside itself: what endows it
with some vague sense of unity is that Orient is that which is

excluded and objectified by the West, in the service of its historical

progress. From the outset the Orient is a shadow of the West.

It should be clear, then, why | am so sceptical about geographical definitions and distinctions: they obscure the tremen-
dously complex and subtle histories that have led up to the "global" age. It's for these reasons that a more subtle and com-
plex term--| advocate “inter-East"--seems much more fruitful. Such a term invites us to recognise without totalizing the ori-
ental melodies in Trance-Techno-music as played by a Croatian DJ, and to discuss in a more nuanced way the many as-
pects of VCR network within the Macedonian and Croatian refugees and exiles in Australia (see, for example, Dona Kolar-
Panov, "Video, War, and the Diasporic Imagination,” Routledge, 1997). And, of course, it allows us to analyse the effects
and influence of Japanese subculture throughout other Asian area's contexts or to research the active development of
“Bollywood” film industry in Mumbai, India. Such a view invites us to think about Techno-Orientalism as both an ideology
and a tool of critical thinking--not just about “Asia” or the “Orient” but also about the complex interrelations and interac-
tions of many cultures. And surely what we should consider in an inter-East forum is not just cultural ephemera but also
many kinds of media activisms and social movements and their articulations.

Needless to say, there are many cultural and political differences between East Asia and Eastern Europe; we cannot over-
look or underestimate them. But each of these regions is similarly home to enormous cultural and political differences.
These differences invite careful observation and regard for the variety of practice of making free space, using the net and
radio, organising sociability, and so on. And in this regard, “inter-East” is very helpful too: not only does it free us from
needless geographical assumptions, but it opens up into newer virtual “spaces,” psychogeographic “spaces,” and so on.
And this, in turn, allows us to use concepts involving the "translocal" more fluidly, which sidesteps the obsolete dichoto-
my between “local” and “global.”

Despite this promising vision, it will be difficult to move beyond regionally specific differences. It is har to “invent” translo-
cal imaginations in many inter-Eastern areas. But there are histories and efforts that are related, some of them decades old:
free radio movements, pirate and gay TV in Malaysia, free space and free media movements in Seoul, the free radio and
anti-wiretap movements in Japan, independent Internet activities in other areas, and so on. These might be a good place to
start as we try to elaborate new critical theories relevant and adequate to the inter-East and translocal phenomena.