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turn tightens the endocolonial belt. Considering that the U.S. is currently involved in the rapid creation and expansion
of security agencies devoted to policing electronii inality (and since these agencies make no distinction between po-
litically motivated action and criminality for profit), it seems misguided to give power vectors increased means for raising
public support for this military growth as a well as a basis for increased national and international legislation regarding
political management of new electronic media.

Whether simulationist tactics could be used in a more compelling way is difficult to say. Since the CIA and the FBI have
been using these tactics for decades, it is easy to locate examples that could be inverted. One of the classics is the ClA~s
toppling of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in order to support United Fruit, protect oil interests, and undermine a
democracy with such leftist leanings that it legitimized the communist party within the U.S. sphere of influence! To be
‘sure, the CIA built its operational infrastructure well by using economic sabotage to create unrest, but the final act was
one of electronic subversion. The CIA simulated field radio broadcasts of antigovernment troop movements around the
capital. Upon intercepting these broadcasts, the Guatemalan government became convinced that a large rebel army had
been mustered and was preparing for an attack. To the contrary, the public was overwhelmingly supportive of the govern-
ment, and only a modest rebel faction existed. Unfortunately, government officials panicked and the government fell in dis-
array.

The FBI used a similar means of subversion by employing hyperreal communications in its attack on the Black Panthers.
Much like the CIA~s intervention in Guatemala, the FBI~s infowar had a strong infrastructure. The Bureau had infiltrated
the Black Panther Party (BPP) and was close to the high command, so it knew the nature of (and the players in) the party~s
internal struggles. It had also successfully used local law enforcement to harass chapters across the U.S. The party~s
treasury was perpetually depleted due to the persistent arrests of members by police, who intentionally abused their power
in order to drain party funds by forcing the membership to continually post bail for those detained. Given these conditions,
paranoia was the order of the day for the Black Panthers, and when the schism between the San Francisco and the New
York chapters erupted, the FBI saw a perfect opportunity to implode the party. As a result of a simple letter-writing cam-
paign that fanned the flames of mistrust between east and west leadership, the party collapsed amid its own internal fight-
ing. (The FBI~s campaign consisted of the creation and delivery of documents made to look as if they originated from in-
ternal party opposition that criticized specific leaders and their party policies.)

This method could be inverted and turned against authoritarian agencies. The infighting that already occurs within and
between government and corporate institutions makes them self-subsidizing targets. The military and economic infra-
structure that was necessary for the operations in the examples given here is not necessary for ECD operations, since the
internal warfare is already occurring (given capital~s tendency toward predation, fear and paranoia are a part of everyday
life experience for those deep within power vectors, and hence no expenditure is necessary to create them, as was nec-
essary with the BPP). Certainly, carefully written and directed letter(s)/e-mail messages could have an implosive effect
(although it~s doubtful that a full collapse would ensue); however, the lessons learned from these classic cases of simu-
lationist tactics have to be understood and applied. First and most obvious, this form of resistance would be covert.
Second, reliable insider intelligence would need to be acquired. This is the most problematic area in this kind of tactical
maneuvering, although it is not impossible to find solutions. For simulationist tactics of resistance to be successfully em-
ployed, methods and means of research, intelligence gathering, and informant recruitment have to be developed. (CAE is
willing to bet that the next breakthrough paper on resistance will address this very problem of amateur intelligence gen-
eration.) Until that occurs, subjective-subversive action will be pretty ineffectual. At present, those not involved in a fully
developed covert approach can only act tactically in regard to the strategic principles of an institution rather than to spe-
cific situations and relationships. Obviously enough, a tactical response to a strategic initiative makes no sense. In all
probability such action will not have the desired effect, and will only alert the agency being hit to prepare for potential ex-
ternal pressures. We must also remember that simulationist infowar is only a destructive tactic--it is a way to cause in-
stitutional implosion, and has very little productive value in terms of policy reconstruction. To continue with the example
of racism, agencies that have institutionalized racist policies (and that includes pretty much every institution in the pan-
capitalist regime) will not be changed by an infowar of institutional attrition. The semiotic regime of racist policies will

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