The Schematism of Conceptual Art; from the Analytic Proposition to the Culture Industry.

Stephen Zepke

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In 1968 Joseph Kosuth, a 23 year old artist in New York, read the second edition of A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth and Logic* that had been published 20 years earlier. While Logical Positivism had lost some of its momentum by the late ‘60s, Kosuth’s application of Ayer to art was part of a seismic shift in the cultural landscape, introducing, as his most famous essay has it, ‘Art After Philosophy’, or as it was more generally known, Conceptual Art. This new type of art avoided the gaze of the viewer, devaluing art’s aesthetic operations by subordinating them to art’s new “object”, the concept. Art no longer needed to appear, and nor was it designed to cause us pleasure or pain, meaning, as Kosuth triumphantly declared, ‘a conceptual work of art in the traditional sense, is a contradiction in terms.’ (Qd Buchloh 412). Suddenly, thought and its linguistic expression emerged as alternative mediums to the traditional materials and methods of the visual arts, a trend that had emerged earlier in the 60s, but which Kosuth perhaps took to its limit. As Peter Osborne has convincingly demonstrated, this not only transformed art’s aims and appearance, but its ontology as well, giving rise to the new genre of Contemporary art, which Osborne calls, ‘Postconceptual art’. I will come back to this.

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In Kant’s system the schemata mediate and regulate the application of conceptual categories to sensibility, an operation providing experience with ‘*signification’* [*Bedeutung*] and thus creating meaning and things. Schemata, Kant writes, ’serve merely to subject appearances to universal rules of synthesis, and thus to make them fit for thoroughgoing connection in one experience’ (A 146). The schematism is therefore the operation by which raw experience appears in inner sense, or in time, thus making images possible. When an object is empirically experienced the schematism has located a manifold of intuitions in time and space according to the categories of the understanding. This is, to put it rather bluntly, the realm of the aesthetic in Kant’s First Critique. In the Third Critique, however, Kant offers us another sense of aesthetic, one that involves the sensations of pleasure and pain consequent to an aesthetic judgement concern the beautiful or the sublime. These feelings, and the judgements they imply, arise when the imagination and the understanding have an ambiguous relation, as in the beautiful, or their relation has been severed, as in the sublime. It will be in the relationship between Kant’s two senses of the aesthetic, and the schematism’s role in them, that Conceptual Art’s trajectory, at least for us, will play out.

As we have seen, in 1968 Kosuth detaches Kant’s first sense of the aesthetic, and the schematism that makes it possible, from aesthetic judgements. At the same time, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze suggests the opposite, seeking to combine Kant’s two senses of the aesthetic, he explains, ‘to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, while at the same time the work of art appears as experimentation’ (1994 68).[[1]](#footnote-2) Deleuze’s version of the Transcendental Aesthetic unites its objective and subjective aspects as Kant distinguishes them in the First and Third Critiques, sheering the sensible from its conceptual determination, and redeploying the ‘hidden art’ of the schematism on the side of the sensible to ‘dramatise’ the Ideas. Deleuze therefore proposes a schematism that operates like an aesthetic judgement of taste where, as Kant has it, ‘the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept’ (§35). Here, sublime sensations qua works of art produce spatio-temporal dynamisms that are, Deleuze writes, ‘no longer schemata of concepts but dramas of Ideas’ (1994 218), embodying ‘a stubbornness of the existent in intuition, which resists every specification of concepts no matter how far this is taken.’ (1995 13)[[2]](#footnote-3) Deleuze therefore denies Conceptual Art’s fundamental premise, obstinately insisting that it does ‘not substitute the concept for the sensation; rather [it] creates sensations and not concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 198). Deleuze and Kosuth both utilise philosophical understandings of the aesthetic, on the one hand to combine Kant’s senses of the aesthetic and on the other to detach them, but as Osborne is going to emphasise only Kosuth’s version will play a part in Contemporary art’s continuing development. In fact, Osborne sees an epoch changing ontological shift occurring in Kosuth’s work that definitively ends, he claims, the aesthetic ontology of art employed from Kant to Modernism. I will attempt to trace this shift in terms of the schematism, before examining Conceptual or Postconceptual art in terms of Adorno and Horkheimer’s version of the schematism, which they associate with the ‘culture industry’.

Kosuth, paraphrasing Ayer, rejects any speculation about art beyond describing its specific function and appearance. ‘Aesthetics,’ Kosuth claims, is ‘conceptually irrelevant to art’ (19) because it only provides opinions about perception, and so is ‘*always* extraneous to an object’s function or ‘reason to be’ (16). Art’s functional definition, he argues, rests on it being identified as art, giving it an ‘art condition’ (17) guaranteed by the artist. This conceptual act is only implicit in the traditional arts, whose art condition rests instead on their morphological consistency, but this, Kosuth sniffs, doesn’t ‘add any knowledge (or facts) to our understanding of the nature or function of art’ (17). This ‘mindless art’ (18), as he calls it, does not consider ‘the conceptual element in works of art’ (18), which, inspired by Duchamp’s readymade, makes ‘a work of art a kind of *proposition* presented within the context of art as a comment on art’ (19-20).

Paraphrasing A. J. Ayer, Kosuth claims that Conceptual art utilises analytic propositions to propose a definition of itself;

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 The validity of artistic propositions is not dependent on any empirical, much less any aesthetic, presupposition about the nature of things. For the artist, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his propositions are capable of logically following that growth. In other words, the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in *character* – that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physics or even mental objects; they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art. Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. […] it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact. (20-1)

As a result, the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of conceptual art is only concerned with the appearance of its ‘concept’. Kosuth employs Kant’s definition of analytic judgement to describe this mode of appearing, where, as Kant puts it, the concept and its object are ‘thought by identity’ (A7), the object merely ‘explicating’, ’elucidating’ or ‘clarifying’ [*Erlauterung*][[3]](#footnote-4) the concept, without adding anything to it. Normal judgements of experience are synthetic because they add things to the concept, but ‘a proposition is analytic’, A. J. Ayer explains, ‘when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols contained’ (78). Analytic propositions therefore do not ‘provide any information about any matter of fact: In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content. And it is for this reason that no experience can confute them.’ (79) In these terms, Kosuth writes, ‘aesthetics are conceptually irrelevant to art’ (19), because ‘art’s viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience’ (22). As a result, Kosuth continues, ‘a work of art is a kind of *proposition* presented within the context of art as a comment on art’ (19-20). In this sense, Kosuth claims, ‘objects are conceptually irrelevant to the condition of art’ (26). This disentangles art from (Continental) philosophy, and from the world, allowing it to exist entirely for its own sake. As Kosuth puts it, ‘Art’s only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art.’ (24)

As a result, qua analytic proposition art negates all referentiality, whether to the historical context of the artistic sign or to its social function and use. ’Works of art are analytic propositions.’ Kosuth claims, ‘if viewed within their context – as art – they provide no information what-so-ever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art *is* art, which means, is a *definition* of art. Thus, that it is art is true *a priori*.’ (20)

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Analytic propositions, Kant argues, identify properties of something that are necessary for it to be that thing. A concept of a body, Kant explains, includes a priori extension, impenetrability, shape, etc. (A 8/B 12). If Kosuth’s *Five Words of Green Neon* are an analytic judgement, then they only require the schematism insofar as they are an object, and this has nothing to do with them being art. Logical Positivism argued that philosophy is able to aspire to the rigour of science on this basis, providing strict criteria by which sentences, and as Kosuth extrapolates art, can be empirically verified as true or false.[[4]](#footnote-5) Kosuth explored this tautological relation as a way to bring the art work qua object as close as possible to its conceptual genesis, and so to determine its appearance purely through conceptual conditions.

Kosuth’s conception of the schema is important because it shows how Conceptual art detaches the First Critique’s account of the aesthetic from that in the Third. But Kosuth’s demand for a tautological relation between concept and appearance is extreme, and was certainly not required by all Conceptual artists, many of whom continued to utilise aesthetic practices in the traditional sense. In this regard Sol Le Witt’s version of Conceptual Art has perhaps been more influential, where the art work’s aesthetic dimension is mostly determined by its conceptual conditions, but a portion of the work is also left free of these conditions, and appears only in its aesthetic instantiation. Writing in 1967, LeWitt claims that, ‘the idea or concept is the most important part of the work. […] The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.’ (1999 12) But for LeWitt, the art work qua machine operates in a similar way to Heidegger’s version of the schema, as a ‘Conceptual representing’, where ‘the rule makes its appearance in the manner of its regulation’ (1990 67).

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We can see in this example how LeWitt leaves important aspects of the actualization of the work up to the person drawing it, giving the work a certain openness in how it represents its conceptual regulation. The placement of the colours, their intersection, and the intervals of the parallel lines, for example, are not stipulated in the instructions, freeing an aspect of the aesthetic actualisation of the work from its strict determination by the concept. In this, LeWitt suggests an alternative role for the schema in Conceptual Art than Kosuth, one where the work’s aesthetic actualization is guided rather than determined tautologically by its conceptual conditions. While LeWitt’s division of labor between the artist’s concept and the draughtsman’s actualization of it emphasises that the artist is primarily an intellectual worker, their relationship perhaps comparable to earlier ones between artist’s and their studio, or those in the performing arts. In this sense, LeWitt does not see Conceptual art as a complete break with, or even repression of the past, aesthetic or otherwise, but in his words, a ‘misunderstanding of art of the past’ (1999 107). LeWitt re-orients past aesthetic traditions, and in particular geometric abstraction, by separating the artist’s conceptual work from the concept’s actualization, but in doing so he retains a decisive role for the aesthetic dimension of the work.

This is the aspect of LeWitt’s approach that seems closer to Heidegger’s version of the Schematism than to Kosuth’s, allowing, and perhaps even emphasising the role of the aesthetic in creating the work, rather than trying to erase it. I don’t know whether LeWitt was familiar with Heidegger’s interpretation of the schematism, although it seems unlikely, but he nevertheless seems to echo Heidegger’s view that the schematism is a ‘pure power of the imagination’ (1997 292), a ‘pure making-sensible’ (1990 64) that grounds all experience, and so, all conceptual actualization. The concept itself is not immediately intuitable because it only defines how something can be represented, the rule only appearing in its regulative function. LeWitt’s wall-drawings function as schemata precisely in this way, representing their conceptual regulation by providing images for the concept, while also demonstrating its limits. As Heidegger puts it: ‘The representing of the rule is the schema.’ (1990 69) Because the schematism is found in the productive imagination, the aesthetic becomes the condition of a concept’s appearance, and as such always adds its own touch to it, belying perhaps, Kant’s remark in the B edition, that ‘We cannot think a line without *drawing* it in thought.’ (B 154).[[5]](#footnote-6) Heidegger and LeWitt suggest, instead, that in fact we think a line by actually drawing it, grounding thought and Conceptual Art in the sensible. As I mentioned, Deleuze will radicalise this view of the schematism as providing the real conditions of experience, making Conceptual Art a producer of sensations, like all other art. Similarly, Heidegger will argue that the schematism is Kant’s (and perhaps LeWitt’s) ‘self-defence’ against formal logic (1997 292), insofar as ‘the pure understanding must be grounded in a pure intuition which guides and sustains it’ (1990 63).[[6]](#footnote-7)

This pure intuition, according to Heidegger and following him Deleuze, is the form of time (1990 76).

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‘It is time as given a priori,’ Heidegger writes, ‘which in advance bestows upon the horizon of transcendence the character of the perceivable offer. […] This single and pure ontological horizon is the condition for the possibility that the being given within it can have this or that particular revealed, indeed ontic horizon.’ (1990 76) Time as the ‘ontological horizon’ of appearance grounds transcendental apperception within the imagination, making it the original act of the understanding. As a result, Heidegger resists Kant’s integration of imagination under the understanding in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction,[[7]](#footnote-8) because he sees it as the faculty by which time provides the a priori ontological condition of man’s original being-in-the-world.[[8]](#footnote-9) For both Heidegger and Deleuze the aesthetic aspect of the schematism grounds thought in sensibility, because this means that both receptivity and spontaneity share the same ontological horizon of time. For both, the imagination is the sensible constitution of thought, which is not a logical act of the understanding but the original opening up of sensibility to Being in the synthetic act of temporalisation. As mentioned, Deleuze will understand this a priori ontological temporalisation as the eternal return, severing the imagination from the understanding in order to connect it to problematic Ideas, which act as the real, rather than possible, conditions of experience. Real conditions change along with what they condition, and their eternal return continually produces new sensations and concepts. These real conditions therefore offer a new form of the Transcendental Aesthetic, one in which spatio-temporal dynamisms condition larval selves, prior to the division of the Aesthetic into two parts, the objective dimension guaranteed by space and the subjective dimension of pleasure and pain that is in time (1995 98). This genetic temporality of the productive imagination connects appearance with aesthetics, and makes the artwork and its sensations the experimental mode of a materialised thought. While there have been attempts to propose a version of Postconceptual artistic practices based on this perspective, most notably by Eric Alliez, it remains, as we shall see, a rather dated and so somewhat perverse reading of the actual trajectory of Contemporary art.

Kosuth’s use of Kant’s most ‘scientific’ version of the schematism – the analytic proposition – attempts to entirely control its aesthetic expression, limiting its role to the linguistic expression of the concept. In Kosuth’s terms, this was to redefine art as ‘Art as Idea, as Idea’, and so withdraw the art work from the viewer’s gaze by making it entirely a product and object of thought. The purpose of Kosuth’s repetition is clear when we look at *Five Words in Green Neon*,

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its tautological relation to the meaning of the sentence may seem trivial, but its wider purpose is to insist upon cognitive process and its linguistic expression as the essential element of art, or more precisely art is a critical reflection on this process, liberating art from philosophy only by subsuming philosophy to it. But looking at *Five Words in Green Neon* today is also instructive, because it clearly *looks* like art, its aesthetic withdrawal now assimilated into the range of artistic gestures constituting contemporary artistic practices, and attesting to the continued importance of the aesthetic to art. As a result, Kosuth’s grand ambitions for a new and properly non-aesthetic art limited to reflecting on its own logical conditions has also been dialled down to today’s more modest expectation that art is somehow organised around a concept*.* The presence of this conceptual dimension can be indicated as simply as by a painterly technique that foregrounds its own status as a ‘representation’. This is no doubt because despite more than sixty years of art trying to escape the white cube, its persistence has insured the morphological consistency of much art. What this has also revealed is that when artists place their work outside of this frame, as Kosuth often did, art struggles to appear as art at all. This gesture nevertheless brought art into contact with its outside, clearly rejecting Modernism’s belief in the autonomy and self-sufficiency of aesthetic experience, while placing ‘art’ in direct contact with its social and economic context.

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Kosuth celebrates this fact, proudly claiming that publishing definitions from Roget’s Thesaurus in newspapers around the world – as he did in his work *Second Investigations* (1968-74) – meant it could now be used to wrap your dishes when you moved, but used in this way the fact it is art at all (Conceptual or otherwise) becomes tenuous at best (see Welchman). While this was certainly part of Kosuth’s intention, whose work assumed a very democratic approach to art, an inevitable result of his negation of art’s aesthetic morphology was to risk art having an incognito being-in-the-world that in no way challenged it. This is because Kosuth directs all of his work’s Duchampian agency to escaping the aesthetic dimensions of art, and while it may do so, its consequent status as ‘non-art’ only had meaning as a negation of art. Otherwise you could only wrap dishes with it, or start fires perhaps. Artists had been exploring non-art as an artistic strategy for some years before Kosuth, but figures such as John Cage or Alan Kaprow came to realise that ‘non-art’ needed ‘art’ as its dialectical shadow if it was to avoid melting into ‘life’ (as opposed to changing it).

Adorno’s understanding of the schematism becomes useful here. Contra Kant, Adorno understands Enlightenment reason as a means to control nature rather than than enabling our emancipation from it. For Adorno, the remoteness of Kant’s thing-in-itself means that critical reason can only discover its own conditions, rather than the world itself. In this sense the schematism prepares matter for its subjection to human ends, making our “knowledge” of it fundamentally tautological, and our “autonomy” from nature just another form of captivity. Rather than the schematism telling us something about nature it merely confirms the limits humans place upon it, not only those of critical reason but of the world the Enlightenment put in place. As Adorno puts it: ‘the world in which we are captive is in fact a self-made world: it is the world of exchange, the world of commodities, the world of reified human relations that confront us, presenting us with a facade of objectivity, a second nature.’ (2001 137) This is a succinct formulation of the stakes involved in seeing the schematism as an analytic proposition, as in Logical Positivism and the art work as a tautology, as in Kosuth’s work, or as an aesthetic encounter with our ‘ontological horizon’ as it is for Heidegger and Deleuze, and, on my reading, in LeWitt’s work. Kosuth’s *Second Investigations* evaporates both the aesthetic and contextual marker’s defining it as ‘Art’, in order to locate it within the mass media, and what Adorno and Horkheimer called the culture industry. Their understanding of how the Culture Industry pumps out aesthetic commodities for compulsory consumption is useful here. They argue that the culture industry is founded on, and continually enforces, a tautological idea of politics as the training of an inescapable behavioural reflex connecting the consumer’s sensibility to pre-formed and approved concepts. As they put it: ‘Kant’s formalism still expected a contribution from the individual, who was thought to relate the varied experiences of the senses to fundamental concepts; but industry robs the individual of his function. Its prime service to the customer is to do his schematizing for him.’ (1997 124) In other words, the culture industry not only produces a pre-determined and limited number of commodities, but does so in response to an equally pre-determined and controlled number of desires held by the consumer. This makes the schemata achieving this tautological control of desire and production into, Adorno and Horkeimer argue, a political mechanism of administration that controls all subject-object relations. By attacking its aesthetic autonomy through producing non-art, Conceptual Art is integrated into a culture industry where: ‘Culture as a common denominator already contains in embryo that schematization and process of cataloging and classification which brings culture within the sphere of administration.’ (1997 131) Benjamin Buchloh, borrowing this idea, has argued that Conceptual Art’s ‘aesthetics of administration’, as he calls it, ‘mimed the operating logic of late capitalism and its positivist instrumentality’, and therefore abandoned any political opposition in embracing the existing conditions of possibility. It is worth pointing out that an earlier version of Buchloh’s famous essay appeared in the catalogue to a major exhibition of Conceptual Art in Paris in 1989, where it clearly informed Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of Conceptual Art in *What Is Philosophy?* In this context, Conceptual Art’s ‘non-art’ gestures gained political value only through their negation of modernist aesthetics, and their success in this sense became an important part of what was to become decisive for the emerging category of Contemporary art.

Peter Osborne develops Adorno’s insight in precisely this way, claiming that Conceptual Art’s embrace of the historically determined second nature produced by the schemata of the culture industry is one of is strongest features. For him, Conceptual Art’s cancellation of the aesthetic marks a historical shift in the ontology of art that is the condition of possibility of the contemporary itself. This shift opens art to the wider historical forces of our time, in particular the distributive ontology of the digital image and the separation of exchange and use value under financial capitalism. The schematism in Adorno’s sense is the mediator of this move (2013 37), providing a de-realized, reproducible and ideal structure that is actualized, each time, in a material ‘bearer’. With this in mind, Osborne champions Kosuth’s version of Conceptual art over that of LeWitt, because, he argues, its aesthetic aspect is entirely limited to the role of the schematism, merely rendering concepts sensible in a cognitive experience. (2018 139) On the one hand, these concepts are historically determined, making social form immanent to artistic form, and enabling the unresolved contradictions of our reality to return as problems of the artwork’s form. But on the other, the operation of the schematism is itself historically specific, offering a dialectical model of aesthetic actualization, or as Osborne calls it, the image, that Postconceptual art shares with digital images and finance capitalism. As Osborne puts it, ‘digital technologies of image production render explicit the ontological structure of the image as the *distributive* unity of the relations between a materially embedded virtuality and an infinite multiplicity of possible visualizations.’ (2018 139) If we take away the reference to digital technology, this could be a definition of Kosuth’s practice. Similarly, Kosuth’s ‘double-coding’ of art by actualizing it in non-art materials and practices gave Conceptual Art a dialectical relation to its outside that transformed Modernism’s transcendental aesthetic ontology into a historical one. (Osborne, 2022 25) This is why the negative dialectic of non-art is crucial to contemporary Postconceptual art, because it materializes the contradictions structuring our world, as they are mediated by the schematism, directly within the conflictual development of art. *Crisis as Form*, as Osborne succinctly puts it.[[9]](#footnote-10) As Osborne also points out, the ontological naturalization of time is ideological, insofar as it covers over social and historical differentiations. Certainly Adorno held this against Heidegger, but we can also see this in French philosophers who privilege art as an expression of a transcendental aesthetic and onto-genetic power (Deleuze, Lyotard, Badiou and Ranciere all do this in their own ways), an aesthetic power that emerges outside of historical time, and ignores any art–non-art distinction. As Guattari’s ‘aesthetic paradigm’ attests, there is no non-art here, there is an aesthetic sensation that detaches itself from a determining concept, with art of all types (including Duchamp in Guattari’s book) able to exemplify this. Hence, Conceptual Art can, and indeed must, produce a sensation, as Deleuze and Guattari argue. Similarly Lyotard, in his Preface to Kosuth’s book *Art After Philosophy and After* argues something similar: ‘Words are revealed as things,’ he writes, ‘signifiers are grasped as enigmas, writing is set down as a material thing. In other words, thought is art.’ (2012 519) Thought as the materialization of an ineffable presence absorbs art and philosophy into an ahistorical gesture first made by the caveman and continued today by the contemporary artist. As Lyotard puts it: ‘After philosophy is before it.’ (2012 527) This is, of course, anathema to Osborne, because for him the break introduced by Conceptual art was absolutely necessary to reveal how the ‘aesthetic’ ‘utterly fails’ to account for the ontological specificity of art (2013 49). This specificity is historically determined, and played out through the dialectical tension between art’s transcendental ontological horizon and non-art’s negation of it.

Osborne is interesting because he so effectively dramatises both the political and philosophical implications of the versions of the schematism we have looked at, in terms of Contemporary Art. For Postconceptual art, like Kosuth’s ‘Art After Philosophy’, which acts for Osborne as its conceptual genesis, aesthetics is entirely subordinated by a schematism that reduces it to actualizing the ideal content of the culture industries, as these are found in digital technology and financial capitalism. While LeWitt offers us a version of this where aesthetics plays an expanded role, a path we might argue, in another paper, was closer to Contemporary art’s historical development, what seems nevertheless true is that Conceptual Art put paid to a version of the schematism where aesthetics actualizes an ontological and transcendental real, at least in the realm of art. The ahistorical understandings of aesthetics offered by Deleuze and Guattari, or by Lyotard, have now become historical themselves, demanding a degree of detachment from rational processes that no longer seems, at least for most contemporary artistic practices, a reasonable form of political engagement.

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1. ‘This first beyond already constitutes a kind of Transcendental Aesthetic. If this aesthetic appears more profound to us than that of Kant, it is for the following reason: Kant defines the passive self in terms of simple receptivity, thereby assuming sensations already formed, then merely relating these to the *a priori* forms of the representations which are determined as space and time. In this manner, not only does he unify the passive self by ruling out the possibility of composing space step by step, not only does he deprive this passive self of all power of synthesis (synthesis being reserved for activity), but moreover he cuts the Aesthetic into two parts: the objective element of sensation guaranteed by space and the subjective element which is incarnate in pleasure and pain. The aim of the preceding analyses, on the contrary, has been to show that receptivity must be defined in terms of the formation of local selves or egos, in terms of the passive syntheses of contemplation or contraction, thereby accounting simultaneously for the possibility of experiencing sensations, the power of reproducing them and the value that pleasure assumes as a principle.’ (1995 98) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Deleuze finds support for this view in Kant’s *Prolegomena* where Kant describes an intensive genesis of difference (*innerlich Verschiedenheit*) that cannot be grasped by concepts in the understanding and instead evokes Ideas. As a result, the schema is redeployed by Deleuze as a dramatisation that ‘acts below the sphere of concepts and the representations subsumed by them. There is nothing which does not lose its identity as this is constituted by concepts, and its similarity as this is constituted in representation, when the dynamic space and time of its actual constitution is discovered.’ (1995 218) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Kemp-Smith, Pluhar’s and Guyer and Wood’s respective translations of *Erlauterungs.* [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Ayer proposed a distinction between strong and weak verification. The first if ‘truth could be conclusively established by experience’ (1946 50), and the second if it was possible that experience rendered truth possible. As a result, Ayer wrote, ‘no proposition other than tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis’. (1946 51) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. What Heidegger calls a ‘schema-image’, ‘is a possible presentation of the rule of presentation represented in the schema’ (1990 69). As a result, concepts are grounded in the schemata, which procure images for them. ‘Hence time is not only the necessary pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding, but also their sole, pure possibility of having a certain look. This unique possibility of having a certain look shows itself in itself to be nothing other than always just time and the temporal.’ (1990 73-4) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Heidegger acknowledges this is not Kant’s explicit intention: ‘the schematism grounds the transcendental deduction [of concepts of the understanding], although Kant does not understand schematism in this way. Viewed in terms of our interpretation, the schematism is a reference to the original sphere of the radical grounding of the possibility of ontological knowledge.’ (1997 292) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Where Kant writes, for example, ‘It is understanding which performs, on the *passive* subject whose *power* it is, that act – under the name of a *transcendental synthesis of the imagination* – of which we rightly say that inner-sense is affected by it.’ (B 153) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Kant’s 2nd edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason* transfers the power of synthesis from the imagination to the understanding by omitting A95 and A115-130 (Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. ‘Capitalist crisis is always a crisis in the consistency of or coherence of the social itself. Contemporary art, in the critical sense of that term, is the art of such a situation.’ (Osborne, 2022 38) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)