Conventionally, a response might begin with agreements and conclude with disagreements in order to set off a discussion. However, I want to do the opposite, by quickly naming a few points of critique to arrive at points of agreement from my own perspective as someone embedded in contemporary art as a participant observer.

**Disagreements**

Probably, we still need art histories of conceptual art as a short summer of love between contemporary art and analytic philosophy. But next to Joseph Kosuth and Sol LeWitt (and their respective vicinities to A.J. Ayer and to Nelson Goodman’s concept of allographic art), I want to briefly mention two other artists because discussion of conceptual art have overlooked them too often: Henry Flynt (a former student of philosopher Israel Scheffler at Harvard) who wrote first definition and manifesto of concept art in 1961, and Adrian Piper, an early conceptual artist, who obtained her PhD in philosophy at Harvard in the 1970s; both are practicing philosophers and artists.

Its diversity makes conceptual art, I’d argue, difficult to relate to philosophical concepts when doing justice to its practice. The first question I have is whether “negation of referentiality” was actually something new in Conceptual Art, or rather the established modus operandi of modernist art, turned into a dogma by the art critic and theorist Clement Greenberg in his 1961 essay “Modernist Painting”. In that sense, Kosuth might have already been late to the party, did – in my view - *not* break with modernist aesthetics (Zepke p. 8). You pointed out how his anti-aesthetic position wasn’t shared by LeWitt and other conceptual artists who understood concepts merely as the “machine that makes the art”, not as the art itself. But I’d even go further and argue that the “negation of referentiality” did not survive long in conceptual art if we think – for example - of the political works of Hans Haacke and Adrian Piper in the early 1970s.

Another question is whether Kosuth’s art actually lives up to its non-aesthetic claims. If we, in line with this conference, indeed shift the notions of the aesthetic from Kant’s Third to his First critique, then we could also read Kosuth art as a schema for philosophy of language, perhaps even as a philosophy textbook illustration.

**Agreements**

I can therefore only agree with the statement that “Sol Le Witt’s version of Conceptual Art has perhaps been more influential” where the concept *generates* the art (as a machine), but isn’t identical with it - although this could also be seen as merely a schema, or illustration, of Nelson Goodman’s concept of allographic art.

[You said that, in line with Le Witt’s art, Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s concept of schematism “work better” for contemporary art. One could argue that the what you defined as their understanding of imagination as „the sensible constitution of thought“, as „opening up of sensibility to Being“ sets the stage for contemporary new materialist philosophy that has become a major, and direct, school of thought for many practicing artists today. ]

In practical terms, I nevertheless have to agree with what you analysed as Kosuth’s and Osborne’s conclusions that aesthetics is ‘conceptually irrelevant to art’ , respectively that the “aesthetic’ ‘utterly fails’ to account for the ontological specificity of art“. Where Osborne could be criticized for basing his theory too narrowly on a specific discourse of contemporary art of the 2010s, and even on one particular artist (Walid Raad), the idea that “art’s viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience” seems to have remained an agreement, or officially shared sentiment, in contemporary art, even among today’s contemporary artists whose practice and discourse is no longer “post-conceptual”, such as ruangrupa and the many collectives that made up last year’s documenta fifteen.

But this distancing from the aesthetics is also the expression of an ongoing legitimation crisis of the art system since the 1960s, since not only the ontological specificity, but also the very ontological grounds of art have become unclear - which is why art institutions and art schools operate what I, and probably other people here in the room, perceive and personally experience as a permanent state of crisis. But without its ontological specificity, art may indeed well end up as culture industry, as described by Adorno and Horkheimer, respectively as creative industries. [Which, in the Netherlands, already happened.]

In this sense, the repercussions of conceptual art are still felt today. At the same,I’d argue that the aesthetic actually is present, and continues to provide the ontological ground, but it is a largely unacknowledged and suppressed presence, very like the Freudian id, in contemporary art. This is already true for Kosuth’s works and their meticulous visual design (which, btw., had a major influence on Volkswagen’s billboard advertising campaigns in the 1970s).

Another legacy of conceptual art is that art nowadays understands itself as a research practice, with artists obtaining doctoral degrees. Doing so, art however has to paradoxically legitimize itself through the aesthetic, because this remains its distinct competency in relation to already existing academic research disciplines, including philosophy.

Henry Flynt: “"Concept art" is first of all an art of which the material is "concepts," as the material of for ex. music is sound.” 1961; serial music and mathematics as immediate precedents; “intellectual enjoyment of concepts” -> aesthetic

Adrian Piper, analytical philosopher and conceptual artist, Kant scholar, “Kantian framework” of her art and thinking

Problem: Osborne’s notion of contemporary art as postconceptual art as problematic, or already historical/dated. (For example, in the light of documenta fifteen.)

Concept → schema [spatial patterning of time] → perception/sensibility

schema is the procedural rule by which a category or pure, non-empirical concept is associated with a sense impression ; connects signifier and signified (example: dog; quantity → schema: number), are “pre-conceptual”

“How do new media, forms of artificial intelligence, and digital money get a hold on our souls today? And where does the free and wild creation of schemas that could break their spell

occur?”